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POLICY ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE
MOTIVATION
SIMON ANDERFUHREN-BIGET, FRE´DE´RIC VARONE AND DAVID GIAUQUE
This article analyzes whether and to what extent the policy environment of civil servants has an
impact on their level of Public Service Motivation (PSM). It hypothesizes that public employees
working in different policy domains and stages of the policy cycle are diversely motivated by four
PSM orientations (Compassion, Commitment to the public interest, Self-sacrifice and Attraction to
politics). The empirical results are based on a survey of 6885 Swiss civil servants. They show that
those in charge of Welfare State policies are inclined to have higher levels of ‘Compassion’, whereas
those performing core state functions report lower levels. Furthermore, employees whose main
tasks are related to policy formulation display high levels of the ‘Attraction to politics’ dimension
of PSM. This study questions the generalization of previous findings on PSM that are based on
heterogeneous survey populations.
INTRODUCTION
The Public Service Motivation (PSM) approach claims that public servants have a sense of
public interest and are committed to the concerns of others. Empirical studies measuring
PSM levels, antecedents, and outcomes have investigated very different and, at the
same time, very specific samples of civil servants. On the one hand, some analyze
rather homogeneous populations such as Korean firefighters (Kim 2011), Danish health
practitioners (Andersen 2009), Belgian or North American undergraduates (Clerkin et al.
2009; Vandenabeele 2008), winners of volunteering awards (Perry et al. 2008), Italian
tax experts (Cerase and Farinella 2009), or Chinese social workers (Bangcheng 2009).
On the other hand, heterogeneous samples in terms of policy sectors and occupational
groups were researched (i.e. Bright 2009; Kim 2006; Perry 1996, 1997; Vandenabeele 2009).
Notably, these studies do not discuss in depth any discernible differences between policy
sectors, and observed levels of PSM are set forth as if the entire public sector was a
homogeneous field.
In contrast to this research trend, and in keeping with a long tradition of public
policy analysis, the public sector is better characterized by heterogeneity (i.e. public
service missions, policy tasks, organizational contexts, and working conditions). It thus
makes sense to question the relevance of comparing empirical data from such highly
contrasting situations and, furthermore, whether general conclusions can be drawn from
such comparisons.
This article addresses this theoretical issue by systematically analyzing the potential
relationships between policy-related factors and the PSM level of public employees. Our
main goal is to couple the PSM approach with some of the basic concepts of classical
policy analysis. Rather than discussing all of the facets of the public policy perspective
in this article, we focus on two main dimensions characterizing the context of any public
policy: the peculiarities of the policy sectors (or domains), and the main responsibilities of
the civil servant regarding the stages (or sequences) of the policy cycle. This article thus
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combines the individual-level, management-oriented PSM construct with a meso-level
approach for scrutinizing state action in specific policy sectors and during particular
policy stages.
Empirically, this study assesses the relations between the policy domains and policy
sequences in which civil servants work, on the one hand, and the four motiva-
tional orientations embedded in the PSM concept on the other. The rationales are
based on the Attraction–Selection–Attrition framework, a refinement of the greater
Person–Environment fit paradigm, which stipulates that ‘certain types of people are
attracted to, and prefer, particular types of organizations; organizations formally and
informally select certain types of people to join the organization; and attrition occurs
when people who do not fit a particular organization leave’ (Schneider et al. 2000, p. 67).
As public service motivated employees hold particular values – since PSM is a value-laden
concept at the individual level – they are more likely to seek and keep positions in the
public sector that are congruent with what they valorize.
In this article, we aim to answer the following research question: Does a civil servant’s level
of PSM relate to the policy domain and/or the policy stage in which he/she is involved? In terms of
PSM research, this investigation responds to several calls to elucidate how PSM levels are
distributed amongst the various tasks endorsed by different public employees (among
them: Pandey and Stazyk 2008). Our argument is presented in four steps. The theoretical
section defines the dependent variable (i.e. level of PSM) and the independent variables
(i.e. policy sectors and stages of the policy cycle), as well as the research hypotheses. The
sample is described as well as the measure and statistical strategy in the methodological
section. The subsequent section presents the results of the analyses in two steps (i.e. mean
differences analysis and regression model). Finally, the implications of these results are
discussed in the concluding section.
THEORY: LINKING POLICY ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE
MOTIVATION
A public policy may be defined as a series of decisions and actions taken by public
authorities to resolve a public problem (e.g. pollution, unemployment, price instability,
urban violence, gender inequality) that is identified as a priority on the political agenda
(Knoepfel et al. 2007). Such state responses are designed and implemented by profes-
sionals working in various policy sectors (e.g. security) and their corresponding public
administrations and agencies (e.g. Ministry of the Interior). Before turning to the variables
characterizing the policy context in which civil servants are embedded (i.e. policy sectors
and stages), we discuss the definition and dimensionality of PSM, as well as the strategies
undertaken to unveil its explanatory factors.
Understanding PSM and its fostering factors
To be clear, PSM is neither an exclusive feature of public employees nor is it the only
motivational factor of public employees (Anderfuhren-Biget et al. 2010; Perry and Hon-
deghem 2008). Accordingly, the PSM inclination can be understood as a particular sense
of commitment to ‘public service values’ that can in turn be endorsed by organizations of
different types. PSM thus circumscribes ‘the beliefs, values and attitudes that go beyond
self-interest and organizational interest, that concern the interest of a larger political entity
and that motivate individuals to act accordingly whenever appropriate’ (Vandenabeele
2007, p. 20). For an overview of the definitions, see Perry et al. (2010).
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Empirically, Perry (1996) made the first attempt at creating a measurement scale after
which PSM has comprised four sub-dimensions. Attraction to politics characterizes public
employees who prefer to serve the public interest by influencing political processes or
those who are particularly interested in the political sphere. Commitment to the public
interest describes civil servants’ aspirations for pursuing the common good and furthering
the public interest (i.e. achieving policy goals). Compassion is a unique feeling of sympathy
for the suffering of others that involves emotions and empathy towards others (i.e. target
groups of a given public policy), a sense of understanding, and the drive to protect. Self-
sacrifice or ‘willingness to substitute service to others for tangible personal rewards’ (Perry
1996, p. 6) is characterized by a devotional desire to help others and a sense of abnegation.
This combination has the advantage of covering most of the motivational particularities
of public service by encompassing diversified motivational inclinations (Bright 2009;
Vandenabeele 2009). For instance, compassionate public servants do not necessarily show
a high level of ‘Attraction to politics’ and vice versa. Therefore, we expect that the four
PSM dimensions will be differentially related to the policy variables investigated here. In
so doing, we are also following recent articles that recommend the operationalization of
the four PSM dimensions as separate components, as such specification dovetails with the
original conceptualization of PSM (Kim 2011), and is empirically coherent as the different
PSM orientations are diversely related to attitudinal outcomes like resigned satisfaction
(Giauque et al. 2012). Concretely, we posit that the different policy domains and stages
of the policymaking process attract, select, or retain individuals having different PSM
motivational orientations. Consequently, we analyze how they are differentially related
to the policy environment of civil servants.
Different strategies have been used to identify the factors related to PSM, but most have
not considered the policy environment as a relevant feature. Conversely, PSM scholars
have principally directed their attention towards individual, institutional, organizational,
or sociopolitical factors. For instance, it can be assumed that a high level of PSM is
more likely to be found among well-educated older men (for an overview of individ-
ual antecedents, see Pandey and Stazyk 2008). Family, religion, and professions were
originally identified as the institutions fostering PSM (Perry 1997). Parental modelling,
either as altruistic exemplars (Perry 1997; Perry et al. 2008), or as public service exemplars
(Vandenabeele 2011), also has a positive effect on PSM. A sense of spirituality and a belief
in transcendence seem to be closely related to public service work, as well as volunteering
behaviours (Houston and Cartwright 2007; Perry et al. 2008).
In contrast to these robust results, no definitive statement can be made regarding how
professions can determine PSM (Moynihan and Pandey 2007; Perry 1997). The results
on how organizational membership predicts PSM are also rather mixed (Camilleri 2007;
Castaing 2006; Moynihan and Pandey 2007; Naff and Crum 1999; Steijn 2006). However,
hierarchical level (Camilleri 2007; Moynihan and Pandey 2007), encouraging job features
(Camilleri 2007; Park and Rainey 2007), a constructive relationship with leadership
(Camilleri 2007; Park and Rainey 2007), and a positive perception of the organization
(Camilleri 2007) are all strong predictors of PSM. In a nutshell, different organizational
practices have the potential to enhance or undermine PSM (Anderfuhren-Biget et al. 2010;
Giauque et al. 2013). Finally, social capital factors (e.g. associational involvement, social
trust, or political participation) as well as differences in cultural belonging also contribute
to the explanation of PSM level (Anderfuhren-Biget 2012).
To the best of our knowledge, only two studies have, in some ways, explicitly addressed
the heterogeneity of the policy environment as a correlate of PSM (Castaing 2006; Leisink
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and Steijn 2009). Both studies’ results are discussed below in relation to the relevant
dimensions of the policy environment.
Heterogeneity of the administrative system and motivational patterns
This article discusses the expected relationships between two characteristics of the policy
environment as independent variables, and the individual level of PSM as a dependent
variable. However, this causality could be reversed as the theoretical approach suggests
that policy environment is both a determinant of PSM level (i.e. attraction process) and
a consequence of PSM level (i.e. attrition and homogenization processes). We thus focus
more on the strength of the relationship than on the direction of the causality.
Policy sectors are defined by the distinctiveness of the collective problems addressed
and the policy network of actors. In other words, ‘(policy) sectors are organizational
structures, as identifiable (and impermeable) as institutions, and have their own rules,
customs and internal hierarchies’ (John and Cole 2000, p. 249). In this respect, they
constitute semi-autonomous areas of state action and communities of actors who share
common frames or ‘policy images’ that are composed, among other things, of particular
norms and values. This plurality of values (Pesch 2008, p. 335; cited by Van der Wal and
Van Hout 2009, p. 223) is crucial to understanding policymaking processes (John and
Cole 2000), as well as the multiple and sometimes conflicting goals pursued by the state
in various policy sectors (Rainey 2009).
Furthermore, a public policy is frequently presented as a cyclical process involving
phases of agenda-setting, policy formulation, policy implementation, and, ultimately,
evaluation of policy outcome. This overly simplistic description of policymaking processes
provides a valuable heuristic device (Jann and Wegrich 2007) and allows for a clearer
distinction of the concrete tasks performed by civil servants, as well as their formal
competences and responsibilities. Hereafter, we focus on both policy domains and
phases, and their expected relationships with individual levels of PSM.
Policy sectors and PSM
Lowi (1964) has argued that sector-specific issues determine the style of decision-making
and the type of political conflict, not vice versa. This perspective was further developed
by mainstream policy scholars who then focused on policy sectors or subsystems, which are
characterized by a stabilized network of actors and a common cognitive frame. According
to the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith
(1993, 1999; see also Weible et al. 2009, p. 192), distinct policy subsystems are composed of
competing coalitions whose members include legislators, public administrations, interest
groups, researchers, and journalists. These advocacy coalitions represent a relatively
integrated policy community built upon a common ‘belief system’ (Sabatier and Jenkins-
Smith 1993, 1999).
The policy subsystems thus emerge and stabilize throughout the framing of policy
problems to be solved, the division of labour between public administrations, the action
of sector-specific interest groups, the production of professional knowledge, and the
allocation of the public budget between sector-specific programmes (Freeman 1985, p.
483). Furthermore, public administrations participate in such policy subsystems with the
aim of influencing the respective public policies over a fairly long period of time (Sabatier
and Jenkins-Smith 1999, p. 136).
For the cognitive approach to policy analysis, ‘frames of reference’ or ‘belief systems’
are shared among the different actors of a policy sector. Accordingly, if each policy
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sector is characterized by a specific actors’ network (including public employees) and
a specific cognitive frame (including fundamental values and policy beliefs), then it is
worth looking at how previous PSM empirical studies have taken into account such
specifications. Of course, the variety of policy sectors is not always systematically
scrutinized, and this is not a fatal flaw since each study has its own purpose that is
unrelated to the present line of enquiry.
Bright, for example, published two studies using a highly diversified sample of
local government employees (building inspectors, community health workers, sheriffs,
caseworkers, secretaries, district attorneys, librarians, maintenance workers, detectives,
and juvenile counsellors), but did not explicitly address this extraordinary diversity
(Bright 2005, 2009). The same criticism applies to Vandenabeele’s study on Flemish state
employees (Vandenabeele 2009), as well as several others (i.e. Alonso and Lewis 2001;
Camilleri 2007; Perry 1996, 1997). Conversely, to the best of our knowledge, Leisink
and Steijn have published the only study comparing different policy sectors (general
administration, public security, defence, education, and academic hospitals), which
shows rather thin differences in mean levels of PSM dimensions (Leisink and Steijn 2009,
pp. 43–44).
Stages of the policy cycle and PSM
The ‘policy cycle approach’ is a heuristic and sequential representation of public policy
rather than a rigid grid (for a general presentation of the approach, see Jones 1984;
for a more recent critic of the model, see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). The policy
formulation and implementation phases are obviously the most relevant for our research
purposes. As a matter of fact, the role and influence of civil servants are greater in these
two intermediate and well-institutionalized phases than they are in the agenda-setting
and evaluation phases which are open to all policy actors. Furthermore, one can hardly
imagine that a civil servant would be involved only in the agenda-setting phase without
also taking part in the subsequent policy formulation stage. In a similar vein, public
employees who are in charge of conducting a policy evaluation have generally also been
in charge of (parts of) the implementation of previous policies. All in all, we suggest
that the policy cycle be divided into two main stages: policy formulation and policy
implementation, while employees working for internal services should mostly perform
tasks supporting the smooth running of the policymaking process.
This sequential approach offers several advantages for policy scholars, including the
identification of the stakes and actors involved in each stage of the policy cycle. It is also par-
ticularly relevant for PSM studies insofar as one might expect that civil servants involved in
various policy stages will have potentially different motivational features inherent to their
positions within the decision-making process and/or their professional roles (Rouban
1995). For instance, it can be assumed that individuals who have an interest in political
affairs seek jobs that are likely to support such preferences (i.e. policy formulation).
Despite this link between actors’ roles during the policymaking process and PSM values,
few empirical studies have addressed this issue by crossing the policy cycle approach
characterizing performed tasks and the four PSM orientations. Although Castaing’s
empirical analysis is not exactly in line with our objectives, as the author refers to
the very French ‘Corps’ categorization, it nonetheless shows the greater importance of
‘Commitment to the public interest’ for public servants responsible for policy formulation
than for those in charge of internal services provision (Castaing 2006, p. 93).
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The present study goes one step further. As it is based on a sample of Swiss pub-
lic employees working within four policy subsystems besides general administration
(welfare, public utilities, environment and infrastructure, and core state functions) and
performing policy formulation and implementation tasks, it allows for the systematic
assessment of the relationships between the two policy variables (domains and stages)
and the four dimensions of PSM.
Research hypotheses
Our brief literature review shows that previous studies on the (hypothetical) links
between policy environment and PSM levels are sparse and inconclusive. However, one
of the basic postulates of PSM theory expects a positive association between PSM level
and the willingness to join a public organization (Perry and Wise 1990). This primary
expectation received several empirical confirmations (Leisink and Steijn 2008; Lewis and
Frank 2002; Vandenabeele 2008; Vandenabeele et al. 2004; Wright and Christensen 2010).
Nevertheless, as PSM is constituted by four sets of motivational values (‘Attraction to
politics’, ‘Commitment to the public interest’, ‘Compassion’, and ‘Self-sacrifice’), and
because the public sector is characterized by heterogeneity in terms of policy sectors
and stages of the policy cycle, one might legitimately wonder how employees with such
specific values can find jobs in a congruent policy environment. It is therefore relevant to
ask whether and to what extent the motivation of civil servants is related to the specificities
of their respective environments.
To answer this question, we formulate an initial set of research hypotheses whose
rationales rely on the Person–Environment (P–E) fit. This framework postulates that
individuals are willing to work in value congruent environments (Edwards et al. 2006). We
also rely on Attraction–Selection–Attrition (ASA) processes that lead to a homogenization
of the staff values and additional personality traits (Schneider et al. 1995). Accordingly,
individuals join organizations involved in specific policy domains, and specific jobs (i.e.
policy tasks performed) that they expect to be congruent with their own value systems.
Such expected relations are particularly appropriate for the Swiss administrative context
(empirically investigated here), as it is not a career system. Consequently, applicants for
jobs in public administration have full knowledge and understanding of the policy domain,
the tasks performed, and the administrative functions for which they apply (Varone 2007).
Both theoretical frameworks (i.e. P–E fit and ASA) support the expectation that the
policy environments of civil servants are related to their respective PSM levels. The
direction of the causality between the characteristics of the policy environment and
the level of PSM cannot be definitively demonstrated with our methodological design.
However, this is not a major problem per se, as the P–E fit and the ASA frameworks
are compatible with both directions of causality. Hence, PSM can be seen either as a
cause or a consequence of employment choice. PSM is viewed as a determinant of policy
environment preference if one considers attraction processes, while PSM is an outcome if
one focuses on staff selection and the homogenization of staff values.
The present empirical study will not overcome this causality issue, although it sys-
tematically assesses the relationships between PSM dimensions and core features of the
policy environment of civil servants. Such an empirical analysis is relevant, as however
the issue is argued (i.e. PSM as cause or consequence of policy environment), a strong
relation between both variables can eventually be expected.
As we have previously noted, policy environments are permeated by structuring frames
of reference or values that are common to the different actors involved in a public policy
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TABLE 1 Specific dimensional hypotheses
PSM dimensions Hypothesis Theory
Policy domains
Welfare (+) Compassion H1a ASA; Vinzant, 1998
(+) Commitment to the public interest H1b Vinzant, 1998
(+) Self-sacrifice H1c ASA
Core state functions (−) Compassion H2 ASA
Public utilities (+) Commitment to the public interest H3 ASA
Phase of policy cycle
Formulation (+) Attraction to politics H4a ASA
(+) Commitment to the public interest H4b Castaing, 2006
Implementation (+) Compassion H5a ASA
(+) Commitment to the public interest H5b Pandey and Stazyk, 2008
and that transcend governmental levels. Thus, this study expects the different policy
domains (General Administration, Welfare, Public Utilities, Core State Functions) or tasks
along the policy cycle (Policy Formulation, Policy Implementation, Internal Services) to
attract, select, and retain civil servants for whom the different PSM orientations are part of
what they valorize and seek to pursue based on their congruent needs. With regard to the
absence of a detailed literature that combines the PSM and policy analysis perspectives,
this general expectation can be further differentiated in an exploratory manner. Five
specific detailed hypotheses are presented in table 1.
A first set of specific hypotheses is developed upon the aforementioned frameworks
that expect value congruence between policy domains or phase of the policy cycle
and PSM dimensions. A second set of hypotheses is drawn to test previous theoretical
developments or verify previous study results with a more comprehensive design.
For instance, an employee working in the welfare sector (health, education, social work)
is more likely to endorse ‘Compassion’ or ‘Self-sacrifice’ PSM orientation with regard to
its constitutive missions, which have much do to with empathetic feelings for the needs
of others. Such an expectation is empirically supported by findings on social workers,
a professional group prone to exhibiting ‘Compassion’ or ‘Commitment to the public
interest’ (Vinzant 1998). Thus: Civil servants working in the welfare sector have a higher level of
‘Compassion’ (H1a) and of ‘Commitment to the public interest’(H1b), and ‘Self-sacrifice’ (H1c),
respectively, than the others. Turning now to the principal values of a given policy domain, it
is quite straightforward to expect that compassion is not a defining value of civil servants
performing core state tasks in relation to policing or justice, for example. Therefore: Civil
servants working in core state functions have a lower level of ‘Compassion’ than civil servants
working in other sectors (H2).
Following the same reasoning, civil servants working in the public utilities domain
that comprises environmental, infrastructure, or public transportation management and
provision are characterized more by technical expertise than by particular driving motives.
On the contrary, these domains that can be defined as being part of the ‘regulatory state’
are greatly subject to adjudication between private and public interests (Levi-Faur 2005;
Majone 1997). In this sense, civil servants in this sub-field of political action are required to
choose and develop public policies that seek to achieve the public interest. Consequently:
Civil servants working in the utilities sector have a higher level of ‘Commitment to the public
interest’ than civil servants working in other sectors (H3).
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Regarding the formulation phase of the policymaking process, we can presuppose that
civil servants who formulate and design public policies are likely to be interested in
political affairs as they operationalize political choices and trade-offs, and are directly
relating to elected politicians who are their principals. These employees are aware that
political choice is a matter of value allocation and priorities. They want to control the
policy agenda and have clear and defined political values or ideologies that they seek
to serve by influencing the construction of public problems or by participating in the
definition of the objectives of a given public policy. Furthermore, Castaing found that
civil servants responsible for policy formulation have a higher level of ‘Commitment to
the public interest’ (positive association) than civil servants in charge of internal services
provision (negative association) (Castaing 2006, p. 93). On the basis of an anticipated
convergence of interests, as well as on previous empirical findings, we expect that: Civil
servants in charge of policy formulation have a higher level of ‘Attraction to politics’(H4a), with
respect to ‘Commitment to the public interest’, than the others (H4b).
For the implementation phase, the reasoning is similar. Civil servants in charge of the
execution of political choices are likely to be in direct contact with the targeted groups and
thus have the opportunity to develop empathy and ‘Compassion’ for them. As they are
close to their subjects, Pandey and Stazyk have suggested that street-level bureaucrats, or
the public employees that are directly in contact with the beneficiaries of public policies,
who represent a sub-category of implementers in the case of this study, have a greater
sense of ‘Commitment to the public interest’ (Pandey and Stazyk 2008, pp. 113–14).
Therefore: Civil servants in charge of policy implementation have a higher level of ‘Compassion’
(H5a), with respect to ‘Commitment to the public interest’, than the others (H5b).
EMPIRICAL FIELD, MEASURES, ANDMETHOD
Description of the sample
This study uses quantitative survey data of municipal and cantonal civil servants in
Switzerland. With the exception of the Italian-speaking municipalities and cantons, all
potential subjects received an invitation to participate in a survey. In the end, 279
municipalities and nine cantons decided to participate in the study. Depending on their
preferences, administrative unit managers could choose between an online or paper-
based survey. They were responsible for the distribution of the questionnaire and for
the provision of basic statistics (number of employees, percentages of male and female,
supervisory and non-supervisory employees, etc.) to accurately assess the response rate
and the representativeness of the sample.
At the end of this process, the survey was given to 10,150 cantonal civil servants who
returned 3131 questionnaires (response rate of 30.85 per cent) and to 9852 municipal
civil servants, from whom 3754 questionnaires were returned (response rate of 38.1 per
cent). Table 2 provides the socio-demographic description of the data. However, for the
correlation and regression analyses, we proceeded with a listwise treatment of the missing
values, thus ending with a slightly reduced sample constituting 5894 civil servants.
Operationalization of the concepts
Public Service Motivation
Measuring PSM is a ‘hot topic’ for public management scholars (Wright 2008). In this
study, Perry’s (1996) multidimensional measure was taken as the baseline. We reduced the
set of items to a 14-item scale including items for all four PSM dimensions. The items were
Public Administration Vol. 92, No. 4, 2014 (807–825)
© 2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
POLICY ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC SERVICE MOTIVATION 815
TABLE 2 Description of the sample
Sample N=6885
Governmental level Educational level Wage level Hierarchical level
Cantons: 45.5% Secondary school: 2.7% Less than 52,000: 17% Apprentice, Trainee: 3.6%
Municipalities: 54.5% Professional
apprenticeship: 40.9%
52,001–78,000: 26.7% Auxiliary: 0.6%
Cultural belonging
High school diploma: 6.8% 78,001–104,000: 28.5% Employee: 51.3%
Swiss-Germans: 86.8% Upper professional
apprenticeship: 21.2%
104,001–130,000: 17.4% Manager: 30%
Swiss-French: 13.2% University degree: 25.3% 130,001–156,000: 7.3% Senior manager: 13.3%
Other: 3.2% More than 156,000: 3.1% Other: 1.3%
Sex
Males: 55.9%
Females: 44.1%
Average age, in years: 43.5
chosen based on previous research on the psychometric testing of the PSM scale. They are
relevant specifically for the Swiss context. Hence, given the controversies surrounding the
political dimension of PSM (Kim 2009; Ritz 2011), it was operationalized by asking how
public servants are interested in political bargaining and how they like to discuss political
subjects (for details on the items and their contextualization, see Giauque et al. 2011).
Five scales were thus computed to measure PSM as a whole and its four constituent
dimensions. To genuinely reflect the formative nature of the composite construct of
PSM, and given the fact that not all dimensions are measured with the same number
of items, the general scale was computed as the mean of the four dimensions (Kim
2011). Cronbach’s coefficients of reliability are rather low (PSM = 0.557, ‘Attraction to
politics’ = 0.917, ‘Commitment to the public interest’ = 0.636, ‘Compassion’ = 0.667 and
‘Self-sacrifice’ = 0.552), but stayed within the range of previous studies.
Policy sectors
To verify whether PSM is influenced by features related to policy domains, we asked our
respondents to declare their sector of occupation and presented them with 11 possibilities,
each representing examples of professions and working fields or administrative services.
These were combined into four clusters of policy domains: Welfare (health, social,
education, and youths); Public utilities, infrastructures and environment (network indus-
tries, environment, agriculture, energy, public transportation, and mobility); Core state
functions (security, institutions, legal services, and justice); and General administration
(public finances and general administration). For details, see Appendix 1. Practically, for
the mean level analysis, a categorical variable with these four eventualities was created,
where for the regression models, dummy variables were used (1 = belonging to the policy
sector and 0 = not belonging to the policy sector), with ‘General administration’ as the
reference category.
Stages of the policy cycle
To empirically assess the location of our respondents within the policy cycle, we asked
them what their principal type of task was. Three possibilities were offered. The first
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relates to agenda-setting and the formulation of public policy. We provided examples of
administrative services or hierarchical level where the decisions and the political files are
prepared: planning services; direction of administrative services; secretary-general; and
staff headquarters. The second possibility relates to policy implementation. Specifying
that this category is a matter of service delivery to users, we proposed the following
illustrations of tasks: benefits or subsidies provisioning; norm enforcement; authorization
granting; or user counselling.
Finally, the third possibility concerned the provision of internal services to support
the work of the administration. Cases were also proposed to guide the respondents:
accountability of human resource services; information and communication technology;
or legal advice to support administrative tasks. Practically, for the mean analysis, a
categorical variable with these three eventualities was created, where for the regression
models, dummy variables were used (1 = policy formulation, 0 = no policy formulation;
1 = policy implementation, 0 = no policy implementation), with ‘Internal services’ as the
reference category.
Socio-demographics
To maintain comparability with previous studies, the usual socio-demographic variables
(Pandey and Stazyk 2008) constitute, alongside Swiss specificities, the baseline model:
gender (female = 0; male = 1); age (in years); educational, hierarchical, and wage lev-
els; cultural belonging (0 = Swiss-French; 1 = Swiss-German); and level of governance
(0 = municipalities; 1 = cantons).
Methodological strategy
This study proceeds with a set of analyses that recalls elements of the policy environment
in the PSM equation. To reveal PSM levels variations among policy sectors and stages,
two complementary lines of inquiry were considered. First, we compare the mean levels
of the four constituent dimensions of PSM, taking into account different policy domains
and stages. One-way analysis of variance and F-test attest to significant differences (Sirkin
2006). Coefficient Eta2 testifies to the amount of variance in PSM and its dimensions that is
accounted for by the selected variables. After the comparative analysis, an encompassing
model of regressions is tested to reveal the pure effect of the two variables that are studied
and their outcomes. It consists of a three-step model of regressions. The first step is the
baseline model (socio-demographic and context-relevant variables) wherein the second
and third steps analyze how the different policy domains and the respective phases of the
policy cycle are related to PSM.
RESULTS OF THE ANALYSES
Descriptive analyses
As PSM is measured on a five-point Likert agreement scale, its aggregate level (3.58)
is rather high (see Appendix 2). Looking at the dimensions, mean levels are more
diverse: ‘Commitment to the public interest’ has the highest mean value and ‘Self-
sacrifice’ has the lowest. Such a discrepancy reveals the greater importance of pub-
lic interest over selflessness for Swiss civil servants at the municipal and cantonal
levels.
Results displaying how PSM levels vary according to policy domains are presented in
Appendix 3. As all mean differences are significant at an acceptable level, the analysis
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shows that employees working within welfare state missions have the highest level
of PSM taken as a whole. Mean differences at the dimensional level provide a more
nuanced picture. The highest levels of ‘Attraction to politics’ and of ‘Compassion’ are
found amongst employees in the welfare domain. This first result was not expected.
Conversely, the highest levels of ‘Commitment to the public interest’ and of ‘Self-sacrifice’
are found amongst employees working in a policy domain related to the management of
infrastructures, environment, and public utilities. Furthermore, civil servants working for
the core state functions have the lowest level of ‘Compassion’.
Consequently, support for our expectations is mixed: employees working in the welfare
sector show the greatest level of ‘Compassion’ (H1a), but not of ‘Commitment to the
public interest’ (H1b) or ‘Self-sacrifice’ (H1c), whereas those working in core state
functions have the lowest level of ‘Compassion’ (H2). Finally, those who work in
public utilities, environment, and infrastructure sector have, as expected, the highest
level of ‘Commitment to the public interest’ (H3). This result to some extent questions
the findings of Leisink and Steijn’s (2009) study that showed no significant differences
between segments of the Dutch public sector. Considering the Eta2, the difference between
policy domains exerts a greater effect on ‘Compassion’.
Our results on the relation between PSM dimensions and stages of the policy cycle are
presented in Appendix 4. First, the highest mean level of aggregated PSM is found among
employees who perform political tasks and the lowest is attributed to those in charge
of internal services. As testified by the Eta2, this distinction exerts its main effects on
the political dimension of PSM. Moreover, mean level differences amongst the different
stages of the policy cycle are highly significant for two dimensions (‘Attraction to politics’
and ‘Commitment to the public interest’) and are barely significant for the remaining
pair. Consequently, those in charge of policy formulation have the highest levels of
‘Attraction to politics’ and ‘Commitment to the public interest’. Therefore, our hypotheses
expecting the highest levels of ‘Attraction to politics’ and ‘Commitment to the public
interest’ to be found within the policy formulation stage (H4a, H4b) are preliminarily
supported.
Regression models
The general models of this study (table 3) provide several interesting results. First, we
discuss the association of the socio-demographic and contextual variables to PSM and its
four dimensions, and then the relations between policy environment and PSM dimensions.
Results for Model 1 (control variables) confirm most of the previous studies on the
individual antecedents of PSM (for an overview and discussion, see Pandey and Stazyk
2008). However, culture and governance level do have an effect on the explanation of
PSM and particularly on the ‘Commitment to the public interest’ dimension (higher score
for Swiss-Germans and for municipals).
At first glance, PSM seems to be an attribute of public employees in the welfare sector.
But for Models 2 and 3, the distinction between policy domains is significant for all but
one dimension of PSM (‘Self-sacrifice’), whereas differences in policy stages are significant
for two PSM dimensions (‘Attraction to politics’ and ‘Commitment to the public interest’).
Hence, ‘Compassion’ is the PSM dimension that is most influenced by the differences
between policy sectors (R2 = 0.028).
On the other hand, the dimensional results are more significant. In comparison to those
working in the general administration, public employees involved in welfare policies are
much more inclined to have a strong sense of ‘Compassion’ (H1a) and to be interested in
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TABLE 4 Assessment of the hypotheses
Hypothesis Confirmed Mixed Rejected
H1a X
H1b X
H1c X
H2 X
H3 X
H4a X
H4b X
H5a X
H5b X
political debates. Conversely, those working in core state functions are more likely to be
reticent about such empathetic feelings (H2). Public servants working on the maintenance
of public utilities or infrastructure are clearly committed to the public interest (H3), and are
not attracted by politics. Finally, H1c is not supported as ‘Self-sacrifice’ is not influenced
by differences among policy domains, but only by individual and cultural characteristics.
Model 3 tests if and how the inclusion of public employees within a particular stage
of the cycle is related to different PSM dimensions. Unsurprisingly, public employees
who mainly perform tasks in relation to the formulation of public policies are also those
who are most attracted by politics (H4a), but are not particularly committed to the
public interest (H4b). The coefficients for the two remaining dimensions (‘Compassion’
and ‘Self-sacrifice’) are not significant. The related hypotheses are thus not supported
(H5a, H5b).
In summary, the hypotheses regarding policy domains are more supported than the
hypotheses regarding policy stages (table 4). Consequently, value alignment or congru-
ency seems to matter more for a given public policy than for specific tasks. Second,
the hypotheses grounded in our theoretical frameworks (i.e. P–E fit and ASA) are more
systematically supported than those based on previous empirical studies, thus showing
the relevance of this analytical framework to understand PSM dynamics, as suggested by
Gould-Williams and colleagues in this issue (Gould-Williams et al. 2013). However, the
inclusion of the two major dimensions of the policy environment results in low effects size
and greater explanatory power. In fact, the purpose of this study was not to include the
entire range of PSM antecedents, but to attempt to reintegrate concepts of policy analysis
into the academic discussion on PSM.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
This article relates to studies seeking to uncover the factors underlying the relationship
between PSM and employment choice. Its main intention was to analyze how PSM is
influenced by ‘environmental’ variables (i.e. Pandey and Stazyk 2008) by scrutinizing
its relationship to different policy sectors and stages of the policy cycle. As a result,
the separate dimensions of PSM are not evenly distributed, either among the different
missions endorsed by the state in various policy domains, or among the different phases
of political action.
For instance, this study indicates who the compassionate public servants are and where
they are likely to be found given the pivotal prominence of empathy. Employees who
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have sympathy for the welfare of citizens and whose professional values are imbued
with the ethics of care are attracted to jobs in a policy domain that recognizes those
other-related values. Conversely, the professional ethic of those in charge of core state
functions or prerogative powers by assuming legal power is, rather, based on compliance,
norm enforcement, legality, and rationality. By considering both policy sectors and policy
stages, our results build upon those of Andersen (2009) who encourages research to
uncover the vocational correlates of PSM.
Theoretically, the empirical results indicate that civil servants with PSM-like values are
driven by the willingness or need to seek and keep positions within the public sector that
are likely to be congruent with their personal aspirations or motivations or, at least, that
recognize them. As the Swiss administrative context is not defined by a career system,
people who seek jobs in public administrations apply directly for open positions with a
sound knowledge of the mission to be undertaken and thus expect a certain level of value
congruence.
This latter point has some consequences for agency issues and for the quality
of public policies. First, such homogenization could help in solving principal–agent
problems by aligning both categories of interests (Gailmard 2010). Second, civil ser-
vants’ identification with the public policy they work for has a positive effect on its
quality (Tummers et al. 2009). Combined with the professionalism perspective, our
study attests to the fact that if PSM is not the definite variable explaining policy
output, then public service motivated individuals should be considered profession-
als on whom politicians can rely to execute the task for which they were elected. A
greater realization of the common good can be achieved through well-designed public
policies.
The present study necessarily has some limitations. First, as in any process of catego-
rization, the reduction of the numerous policy sectors to four general categories is subject
to debate. Second, causality issues cannot be avoided, and this is still a major issue in PSM
research as noted by several contributors of this volume (i.e. Christensen and Stritch 2013).
Do people enter the public sector with PSM values? And is the public sector capable of
fostering these values? To solve this chicken-or-egg dilemma, well-designed longitudinal
research is required (Wright and Grant 2010). In this study, the public sector is expected
to attract PSM-oriented individuals.
More precisely, individuals with different PSM orientations will seek positions (here
defined in terms of policy sectors and stages) that will best suit their needs in terms of
value congruence. As a result, depending on their public service orientation, civil servants
are quite homogeneous groups in terms of their values. In line with the P–E fit and ASA
theoretical frameworks, this homogeneity is a consequence of an intertwining of both
individuals’ attraction to specific work domains and their selection through application
processes.
Finally, this study also provides avenues for research to further investigate how the
different dimensions of PSM are related to different professions. In that respect, it
should be clearly understood that the public sector in general, and the policy environ-
ment of civil servants in particular, is characterized by heterogeneity. PSM scholars
should thus recognize such complexity at the very least by not treating civil ser-
vants as if they were all doing the same job or working in the same policy field.
Such an oversimplification is tantamount to equating a teacher with a police offi-
cer and expecting them to have the same kinds of professional values and work
motivations.
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APPENDIX
Appendix A1 Categories of Policy Domains
Proposed categories Collapsed categories
Health (hospitals, prevention, retirement homes) Welfare
Social (social subsidies provision, integration, sheltered housing)
Education and youth (schools, youth protection, universities and
higher education)
Infrastructure (roads, property holding, information
technologies)
Public utilities, environment and
infrastructure
Environment (environmental protection, forests, water, town
planning and waste management, sustainable development)
Agriculture (veterinary services, viticulture, hunting, and fishing
management)
Energy (production, management, marketing and
commercialization)
Public transportation and mobility
Security (police, civil and military security, inhabitant control,
penitentiary services)
‘Core state functions’
Institutions, legal services and justice (constitution, bankruptcy,
judicial proceedings, elections and voting)
Public finances and general administration (chancellery, taxation,
human resource management, budgets, controlling)
General administration
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Appendix A3 PSM mean levels, per policy sectors
Sample
(N=6885)
Policy sectors PSM_Total
Mean (SD)
PSM_Pol
Mean (SD)
PSM_CIV
Mean (SD)
PSM_Comp
Mean (SD)
PSM_SS
Mean (SD)
Welfare (n=1588) 3.70 (0.543) 3.57 (1.108) 4.03 (0.606) 4.03 (0.692) 3.17 (0.831)
Public utilities,
environment and
infrastructure (n=1271)
3.60 (0.573) 3.37 (1.123) 4.06 (0.615) 3.68 (0.777) 3.27 (0.860)
Core state functions
(n=983)
3.51 (0.548) 3.35 (1.123) 3.98 (0.599) 3.47 (0.778) 3.22 (0.797)
General
administration(n=1759)
3.51 (0.566) 3.30 (1.149) 3.93 (0.622) 3.62 (0.765) 3.18 (0.827)
Total mean 3.58 (0.564) 3.40 (1.140) 3.99 (0.614) 3.73 (0.777) 3.20 (0.831)
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006
Eta 0.144 0.095 0.081 0.261 0.048
Eta2 0.021 0.009 0.007 0.068 0.002
Appendix A4 PSM mean levels, per policy cycle
Sample
(N=6885)
Policy cycle PSM_Total
Mean (SD)
PSM_Pol
Mean (SD)
PSM_CIV
Mean (SD)
PSM_Comp
Mean (SD)
PSM_SS
Mean (SD)
Policy formulation (n=439) 3.74 (0.521) 3.93 (1.083) 4.08 (0.567) 3.71 (0.776) 3.22 (0.801)
Policy implementation
(n=2885)
3.59 (0.556) 3.48 (1.105) 4.03 (0.615) 3.69 (0.778) 3.17 (0.823)
Internal services (n=2481) 3.55 (0.559) 3.25 (1.137) 3.96 (0.604) 3.74 (0.753) 3.20 (0.823)
Total mean 3.58 (0.552) 3.41 (1.132) 4.00 (0.610) 3.71 (0.767) 3.20 (0.823)
Sig. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.052 0.066
Eta 0.088 0.163 0.068 0.032 0.031
Eta2 0.008 0.026 0.005 0.001 0.001
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